FAQ
About Voting System Standards
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Who
establishes voting system standards?
The
development, promulgation, and revision of the national
voluntary voting system standards is a joint effort headed
by the U.S. Federal Election Commission (FEC) but also
involving:
experts
in developing standards
State
technical experts in voting equipment
Members
of the National Association of State Election Directors
(NASED)
Independent
testing authorities designated by NASED, and
The
Election Center (in its capacity as secretariat for NASED)
The
original standards, published in 1990, and subsequent
revisions also reflect contributions from other election
officials, from designers and manufacturers of voting
systems, from concerned interest groups, and from interested
members of the general public, whose input is received
during public comment periods. Each version of the standards
must be approved by a majority vote of the FEC’s
six Commissioners, prior to final release.
What
are voting system standards?
Voting
system standards are documented agreements containing
technical specifications to be used consistently as guidelines
to ensure that automated voting systems (both those that
use a paper ballot and all electronic systems) are accurate,
reliable, and secure.
The
standards include functional criteria (things that any
voting equipment must do) along with technical requirements
for: hardware, software, security, quality assurance,
and documentation.
The
standards also include testing procedures to ensure that
voting systems meet these requirements.
Note
that the standards address only what a voting system
should do, not how the system should do it. The standards
are not intended to impede the design and development
of new, innovative voting equipment. Nor are they intended
to drive the prices of voting equipment out of the range
of local jurisdictions.
Why
do we need voting system standards?
The
short answer is that we need voting system standards
to help State and local election officials ensure that
the voting systems they buy, and that the public vote
on, work accurately and reliably. The long answer requires
a stroll down memory lane.
During
the 1970’s, nearly anybody could cobble together
a "voting machine" in their garage (and some
of them looked like they had been), then go out and sell
it to unwary local election officials. Few States had
any guidelines for testing or evaluating these devices.
So local officials either had to take the salesman’s
word for it or else depend on the opinion of colleagues
who had already bought it. Voting equipment horror stories
-- some of them funny, some of them downright chilling
-- soon began circulating through the election community.
They triggered concerns about the integrity of the voting
process.
In
1975, the National Bureau of Standards prepared a report
entitled Effective Use of Computing Technology in Vote-Tallying.
The report concluded that one of the basic causes for
computer-related election problems was the lack of appropriate
technical skills at the State and local level for developing
or implementing sophisticated and complex written standards
against which voting system hardware and software could
be tested. This report, along with comments from State
and local election officials, led the U.S. Congress to
designate the FEC to work with the National Bureau of
Standards (now known as the National Institute of Standards
and Technology) to conduct a study of the feasibility
of developing national standards for voting systems.
Following
the release of the feasibility study in 1982, Congress
appropriated funds for the FEC to develop national standards
for computer-based voting systems which the States might
voluntarily adopt. In the course of that effort, the
FEC sponsored thirteen meetings involving more than 130
State and local election officials, independent technical
experts, voting system vendors, Congressional staff,
and computer security advocates. On January 25, 1990,
the FEC approved for publication the first voluntary
national performance and test standards for punchcard,
marksense, and direct recording electronic voting systems.
Today,
37 States have adopted these national standards or require
testing against the standards before a system can be
marketed within their boundaries. As a result, the voting
systems now reaching those markets are (even according
to their designers) greatly improved; State and local
officials are better assured that the devices they buy
will work accurately and reliably; horror stories are
on the decline (and now tend to involve pre-standards
equipment, untested equipment configurations, or the
mismanagement of tested equipment); and one of the greatest
concerns about the integrity of the voting process has
been largely put to rest.
Which
States require voting systems to meet the FEC?
As
of April 2001, the following States have adopted the
FEC’s voting system standards or require the testing
of systems against the standards by independent testing
authorities (ITAs) designated by the National Association
of State Election Directors:
States
Adopting the Voting System Standards or ITA Testing
Alabama,
Iowa, Ohio,
Alaska, Kansas, Pennsylvania,
California, Kentucky, Rhode Island,
Colorado, Louisiana, South Carolina,
Connecticut, Maine, South Dakota,
Delaware, Maryland, Tennessee,
District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Texas,
Florida, Michigan, Utah,
Georgia, Minnesota, Virginia,
Hawaii, Missouri, Washington,
Idaho, Nevada, Wyoming,
Illinois, New Mexico,
Indiana, New York.
Who
decides if voting equipment meets the voting system
standards?
The
standards call for three levels of tests to be performed
on voting systems to ensure that the end product works
accurately, reliably, and appropriately:
Qualification
tests to be performed by independent testing authorities
(ITAs) designated by the National Association of State
Election Directors;
Certification tests to be performed by the State; and
Acceptance tests to be performed by the jurisdiction acquiring the system.
Qualification tests, conducted by an independent testing authority, encompass:
a
selectively in-depth examination of the software;
an
inspection and evaluation of system documentation;
tests
of hardware under conditions simulating the intended
storage, operation, transportation, and maintenance environments;
and
operational
tests verifying system performance and function under
normal and abnormal conditions.
The
scope of qualification testing should not be confused
with the vendor’s developmental testing. Qualification
testing is the process whereby a voting system is shown
to comply with the requirements of its own design specifications
and with the requirements of the standards. The ITA is
expected to evaluate the completeness of the vendor’s
developmental test program including the sufficiency
of vendor tests conducted to demonstrate compliance with
performance specifications. The ITA also performs sample
testing of the vendor’s test modules and designs
independent system-level tests to supplement and check
those designed by the vendor.
Certification
tests should be conducted by individual States in order
to ensure that the voting system complies with State
laws and election practices and is appropriate to the
intended environment. Accordingly, certification criteria
are not included in the standards since they must be
defined by each State. We recommend, however, that they
not duplicate the qualification tests but rather include
functional tests and qualitative assessments to ensure
that the system functions in accordance with State law
and practice.
Acceptance
tests should be performed by the jurisdiction (State
or local) procuring the voting system. The purpose of
acceptance tests is to ensure that the units delivered
to the user conform to the system characteristics specified
in the procurement documentation as well as those demonstrated
in the in the qualification and certification tests.
Some of the operational tests conducted during qualification
should be repeated on each unit during the acceptance
test.
Only
through these three testing procedures can local election
officials ensure that the voting equipment delivered
will function accurately and reliably.
How
can I determine if voting equipment has met the voting
system standards?
First,
it is important to recognize that the independent testing
authorities are not in the business of approving whole
companies. Instead, they test and qualify only specific
voting systems. Any given vendor may offer both systems
that have been tested and systems that have not been
qualified. It is essential, then, that you get a description
of the configuration, the model number, and the software
version of any equipment that you want check up on. There
are then three avenues you can take. You can:
ask
the vendor to provide documented evidence that the equipment
you are interested in has been successfully tested by
an independent testing authority (ITA) designated by
the National Association of State Election Directors
(NASED).
ask
your chief State election official if the equipment has
been successfully tested by an ITA designated by NASED
and if it has been certified by the State.
contact
the Election Center which, in its capacity as secretariat
to NASED’s ITA Committee, maintains records on
all systems that have been successfully tested by an
ITA. The Election Center may be contacted at:
The
Election Center
12543 Westella St, Ste 100
Houston, TX 77077-3929
Tel: 281-293-0101
Fax: 281-293-0453
E-mail: electioncent@pdq.net
Are
the current national voting system standards up-to-date?
Not
entirely. Standards are not permanent. They must evolve
alongside technological advancements. Indeed, it is common
practice to review and update technical standards every
five years or so. The voting system standards, issued
in 1990, are no exception to this rule. Vendors are now
using new technology and expanding system functions that
are not sufficiently covered by the existing standards.
Therefore, the FEC is drafting the next version of the
standards to cover the newer technology as well as to
change standards that currently unduly restrict design.
Still
in all, the current standards remain for the most part
adequate and useful for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy
and reliability of voting systems.
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